Institutions and Economic Development. New tests and new doubts. by Angeles, Luis
scottish institute for research in economics
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER
SIRE-DP-2010-75
Institutions and Economic Development.
New tests and new doubts.
Luis Angeles 
University of Glasgow
www.sire.ac.uk
Institutions and Economic Development.
New tests and new doubts.
Luis Angeles
September 30, 2010
Abstract
Is institutional quality a major driver of economic development?
This paper tackles the question by focusing on the within-country
variation of growth rates of GDP per capita. While previous attempts
using this methodology have controlled for many of the standard de-
terminants of the empirical growth literature, we argue that such ap-
proach is not adequate if good institutions are the main reason behind
decisions to invest in human or physical capital accumulation or to
engage in international trade. Our regressions exclude the proximate
causes of growth in order to estimate the overall e¤ect of institutional
quality. Perhaps surprisingly, we nd no support for the thesis that in-
stitutional quality improves economic growth. These results encourage
a reconsideration of the evidence provided elsewhere in the literature.
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1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a growing acceptance of the idea that institutions
are the ultimate driver of economic development (see Acemoglu et al. 2005
for a review of the literature emphasizing this view). While discussions of
the role of institutions in economic development can be traced all the way
back to Adam Smith1, the signicant degree of consensus in todays debate
is perhaps unprecedented. To a large extent, the current literature has used
the work of Douglass C. North as the intellectual foundation on which the
case of institutions as the ultimate driver of economic development could be
built.
North describes institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction" (North 1990, p.3). The same essential idea can be
found in later reformulations by other authors, for instance: "Economic in-
stitutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors,
and shape economic outcomes" (Acemoglu et al. 2005). These are powerful
metaphors for our ears, accustomed to think in terms of constrained max-
imization as the rule guiding personal actions. In a nutshell, North argues
that if the "rules of the game" are such that agents can secure the returns
of investing in physical capital, human capital and new ideas then these
investments will take place and economic progress will follow. Otherwise,
people would invest in rent seeking, political competition and violence; and
economic stagnation or decline would be the consequence.
The empirical case for institutions as the main cause of long run economic
development has been advanced and strengthened by Knack and Keefer
(1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Easterly and
Levine (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) among
1See, for instance, Smiths discussion in Chapter 3, Book V of The Wealth of Nations.
Most themes of the current literature on institutions, from secure property rights to the
rule of law, had been pointed out by Smith more than two centuries ago.
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others. The general outline that this section of the literature has followed
was set up by Hall and Jones (1999). We start from the observation that
the cross-sectional variation in measures of institutional quality is highly
correlated with levels of GDP per capita. This cannot be interpreted as
a causal relationship due to a likely endogeneity problem. To address this
problem researchers instrument institutional quality with variables related
to the countrys climate, geography or history in the hope of uncovering a
causal relationship.
The most inuential work in this line of research has been Acemoglu et
al. (2001, 2002). The authors instrument institutional quality with colonial-
related variables such as the mortality of European settlers in colonial times
or the population density of colonized areas; the argument being that these
variables determined the degree of European settlement in the colonies which
in turn dictated the initial institutional setting. They reach the conclusion
that institutional quality has a large causal e¤ect on economic development.
Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) show that these re-
sults continue to hold when controlling for measures of geography and trade
openness.
The above empirical literature can be criticized on two methodological
aspects: it is cross-sectional and it uses levels (instead of growth rates) of
GDP per capita2.
Because cross-sectional regressions rely exclusively on the between-country
variation in the data their results are always at risk of being biased by un-
observed country characteristics. The issue is of particular importance in
2An additional criticism, raised most notably by Glaeser et al. (2004), is the di¢ culty to
justify the use of historical variables as instruments for institutions. Instruments should
not be correlated with the error term in the second-stage regressions, a condition that
would be violated if the historical variables can inuence development through channels
other than institutional quality. Glaeser et al. (2004) put forward the fact that European
colonizers brought their human capital in addition to any institutional structure.
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this context since country-specic characteristics such as culture, religion or
geography are the main alternatives to institutional quality as "deep" deter-
minants of growth. The standard response to this problem in cross coun-
try regressions is to include control variables, but aspects such as culture
appear di¢ cult to measure and a comprehensive list of all relevant charac-
teristics is at the very least elusive. Panel regressions, on the other hand,
are able to signicantly reduce this problem by the inclusion of xed e¤ects:
country-specic intercepts that control for all possible time-invariant country
characteristics.
A second justication for using panel regressions with xed e¤ects instead
of cross-sections is that their results are more relevant for policy advice. At
the moment the results of the literature are invoked to justify a focus on in-
stitutional reform as a pre-condition for growth in developing countries. This
is a risky recommendation if based exclusively on the analysis of between-
country di¤erences since institutions may not be transferable across coun-
tries. Results based on within-country variation, on the other hand, would
stem from actual institutional changes taking place inside a country.
Turning to the second point, the use of levels instead of growth rates
of GDP per capita can also be called into question. The underlying theory
that we are trying to test, Norths views on how institutions a¤ect economic
development, is expressed in terms of growth rates. According to North,
good institutions like secure property rights will result in more investment in
physical capital, human capital and ideas; creating growth along the lines of
standard growth theory from Solow (1956) to Romer (1990). Nobody would
expect the Democratic Republic of Congo to suddenly become a rich country
if it introduces good institutions this year, but that is what a level e¤ect
would imply. On the other hand, it would be natural to expect the DRC to
grow faster; and to progressively become a rich country after a few decades
if institutions remain adequate. Levels of GDP per capita are informative
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because they reect cumulated growth rates; but growth rates should be the
natural rst choice to test the theory3.
A potential objection is that growth rates may reect short term distur-
bances such as the state of the business cycle. This, however, is an objection
that is easily dealt with by considering average growth rates over long enough
periods of time. In this paper we carry out regressions with periods of 5, 10
and 20 years; long enough for business cycles and other short term distur-
bances to be smoothed out. Moreover, even if some observations are a¤ected
by temporary events we would expect positive and negative shocks to coun-
teract each other if the number of observations is large enough.
Some papers in the literature have approached the relationship between
institutions and economic development using a methodological approach dif-
ferent from the one described above. Glaeser et al. (2004) experiment with
cross sectional regressions using growth rates of GDP per capita as the de-
pendent variable. Lee and Kim (2009) consider panel regressions with xed
e¤ects but use the level of GDP per capita as the dependent variable. Dollar
and Kraay (2003) and Bhattacharyya (2009), nally, use panel regressions
with xed e¤ects and growth rates of GDP per capita. This is also the
approach that we follow here, consistent with our view that these method-
ological choices are the most adequate for the present question.
A problem with the results in Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Bhattacharyya
(2009) is that they are derived after controlling for the e¤ects of additional
determinants of economic growth such as human capital, trade openness or
private investment. This is of course in line with common practice in the em-
3Some may argue that if we are interested in the change over the very long run then it
is equivalent to use current levels or growth rates since the initial level of GDP per capita
was about the same around the globe before the Industrial Revolution. Even if we accept
that argument, we should still relate the current level of GDP per capita to the long-run
average of institutional quality - not to its value at the end of the period as it is commonly
done in the literature.
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pirical growth literature, but it poses a delicate question of how to interpret
the results regarding the e¤ects of institutions on growth. The theoretical
case for the importance of institutions clearly indicates that these matter be-
cause they determine the costs and benets of engaging in growth-enhancing
activities such as physical and human capital accumulation or international
trade. If that is the case, then all these factors are just intermediate chan-
nels through which institutions a¤ect growth and we should not control for
them if our aim is to estimate the overall e¤ect of institutional quality. In
other words, factors such as private investment, human capital and interna-
tional trade are proximate determinants of economic growth; they are the
outcome of deeper determinants such as institutional quality and their in-
clusion would pick up some of the growth e¤ects that should ultimately be
ascribed to institutions.
Our paper contributes to the literature by estimating the e¤ects of insti-
tutions on economic development using panel regressions with xed e¤ects,
growth rates of GDP per capita as the dependent variable, and eliminat-
ing control variables that are likely to be themselves the outcome of good
institutions. In addition to these panel regressions, we also investigate the
relationship between institutions and growth using country-by-country re-
gressions, an approach that to the best of our knowledge has not been used
in the literature. Finally, we extent the time coverage of previous studies by
using data for the period 1940-2005, whereas Dollar and Kraay (2003) cover
the period 1960-2000 and Bhattacharyya (2009) focuses on 1980-2004.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data
and section 3 presents our empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our
results and the nal section o¤ers some concluding remarks.
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2 Data
Three data sources have been widely used in the recent institutional lit-
erature: the International Country Risk Guide from Political Risk Services
(ICRG), the Governance Matters dataset from the World Bank, and the
Polity IV dataset. The rst two rely on surveys of investors to construct
their measures while the third one uses assessments from political scientists
on diverse aspects of each countrys institutions. Examples of variables from
these three datasets are, respectively, the risk of expropriation measure used
in Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), the index of the rule of law used in Rodrik
et al. (2004) and the measure of constraints on the executive branch of gov-
ernment used in Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and Glaeser et al. (2004). For
all these measures there is an inevitable degree of subjectiveness as they are
not based on quantiable magnitudes.
Of these three datasets, only Polity IV is available over a long enough
period of time to allow for a meaningful panel study using time periods of
as much as 20 years. The variables from Polity IV start with each countrys
independence year and, for most European and American countries, go all
the way back to 1820. This is in sharp contrast with the ICRG dataset, which
only covers the 80s and 90s, and the Governance Matters dataset, which goes
from 1996 to the present.
Our choice is thus the constraints on the executive variable from Polity IV.
This variable is interesting for reasons other than its time coverage. First
of all, it appears to be a very good match for Norths notions of institu-
tions. The variable "refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on
the decision-making powers of chief executives" (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).
These constraints usually come in the form of a powerful parliament and an
independent judiciary. Douglas North has emphasized the English Glorious
Revolution of 1688 as a prime example of institutional progress, precisely
because it set royal power rmly under the control of Parliament (North and
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Weingast 1989, North 1990)4. Constraints on the executive power are thus
central in the Northian view of good institutions.
Another advantage is that the Polity IVmeasures are not based on surveys
- which may be biased by the image of the country on the international scene
- but are computed by political experts following clear (albeit not easily
quantiable) guidelines. The variable ranges from 1 to 7 and full descriptions
of what would constitute levels 1, 3, 5 and 7 are provided5. While critical
of most institutional measures, Glaeser et al. (2004) identify the Polity IV
variables as the most reliable of the lot and proceed to use them in their
work.
Our data on real GDP per capita comes fromMaddison (2009), who o¤ers
much longer time coverage than alternative sources. Although Maddisons
series extend all the way back to 1820 for some countries, we will focus on
the period 1940-2005 to limit the panel imbalance. Pre-1940 data will still
be used as instruments of future GDP changes. With this data, we calculate
average growth rates over non-overlapping periods of 5, 10 and 20 years using
log-di¤erences (gi;t = 1T (log yi;t log yi;t T ) with T = 5; 10; 20): Having a sam-
ple that starts in 1940 allows for up to three observations per country when
using 20-year periods (1940-60, 1960-80, 1980-2000), six observations when
using 10-year periods and thirteen observations when using 5-year periods.
Table 1 shows the distribution of executive constraints over the period
1940-2006, for all countries in our dataset and for ve di¤erent regions. As
4From then onwards English Kings and Queens could not suspend laws, levy new
taxes, interfere with the juditial system or maintain a standing army without the consent
of Parliament.
5A value of 1, for instance, corresponds to the case of "Unlimited Authority" and would
be assigned under conditions such as "There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but
it is called and dismissed at the executive pleasure". A value of 7 corresponds to the
case of "Executive Parity or Subordination" and its overall description is "Accountability
groups have e¤ective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of
activity". Values 2, 4 and 6 are just described as "intermediate category" (Marshall and
Jaggers 2009).
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could be expected, Western Europe and its o¤shoots fares best while Africa
and the Middle East share the worst places. Note, however, that there is a
lot of variation to identify growth e¤ects: all 7 levels of institutional quality
are present in all regions of the world.
3 Methodology
As discussed above, this paper tests the e¤ect of institutions on economic de-
velopment in panel regressions with xed e¤ects. Our empirical specication
is thus:
gi;t = i + t + yi;t T + Ii;t=t T + "i;t (1)
where gi;t is the average growth rate of GDP per capita in country i over
the last T years (see previous section), yi;t T is the log of GDP per capita in
country i and year t  T (i.e. the beggining-of-period level of development),
Ii;t=t T is the average institutional quality in country i between years t   T
and t; and i and t are country-specic xed e¤ects and time dummies.
While the presence of xed e¤ects controls for all time-invariant country
characteristics such as geography, climate, religion and history, the question
still remains of what other time-varying control variables should be included
in (1). The list of variables used in the voluminous growth literature is long:
investment rates, human capital, trade openness, government expenditures,
ination and many, many more have been tested with varying degrees of
success6. Moreover, the fact that changes in the set of control variables
typically imply large changes in the estimated results was noted early on in
the literature (Levine and Renelt 1992).
As we discussed earlier, the issue of what control variable to include takes
a special turn in the present case since most of them can be argued to be
6See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003, chapter 12) and, for a full list of variables used in
the literature, Durlauf et al. (2005, Appendix 2).
9
the outcome of a good institutional setting. The solution that we propose
is extremely simple: we do not include any additional control variable in
equation (1). The easiest way to understand this choice is by noting that we
are trying to estimate the overall e¤ect of institutions on growth, which may
work through a wealth of alternative channels such as investment in physical
and human capital, good government policies and so on. Controlling for these
aspects would simply remove some of the e¤ects we are trying to capture.
Readers who are not satised with the above argument could complain
that the absence of control variables would lead to a bias in the estimate of :
What is important to realize, however, is that such a bias would most likely
be a positive one. Standard econometric theory (e.g. Wooldridge 2002, p.61-
62) shows that if an omitted variable is correlated with one of our regressors,
in this case with institutional quality, the estimated coe¢ cient would have a
probability limit given by:
plim b =  + Cov(I; q)
V ar(I)
where I is our measure of institutions, q is the omitted variable and  is
the structural e¤ect of the omitted variable on growth. Assume, without loss
of generality, that  > 0 (if the omitted variable is detrimental to growth
redene it with a minus sign in front). What is then the likely sign of the
covariance between institutional quality and this growth-enhancing variable
that has been omitted? Since I is a measure of good institutions, it is natural
to expect this covariance to be positive or at least zero. After all, good in-
stitutions are supposed to promote, or at least not hinder, growth-enhancing
policies such as low ination and growth-enhancing behavior such as invest-
ment in human and physical capital. If I is negatively correlated with a large
number of growth-enhancing factors we may as well doubt of its validity as
a measure of good institutions.
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If  > 0 and Cov(I; q) > 0 the estimated  coe¢ cient will be biased
upwards. To put it di¤erently, we are not claiming that all proximate growth
determinants are caused by institutional quality and therefore that the es-
timated  converges to its true value in their absence. We are making the
weaker claim that some proximate growth determinants are caused by in-
stitutional quality and others are not, but these last ones will tend to be
positively correlated with institutional quality - biasing the estimated  in a
predictable direction.
The consequence of this is that a regression without other controls will
maximize the chances of nding a positive e¤ect of institutions on economic
development. This would mean that a positive coe¢ cient does not ensure
that institutions are growth enhancing, but a negative or zero coe¢ cient does
rule out a positive e¤ect of institutions on growth.
A nal point remains before continuing to our results. As is well-known,
xed e¤ects regressions su¤er by construction from endogeneity bias if they
include a lagged dependent variable - as any growth regression does in order
to control for convergence e¤ects (Caselli et al. 1996, Durlauf et al. 2005).
We deal with this by estimating (1) using the di¤erence GMM estimation
technique of Arellano and Bond (1991), where changes in endogenous vari-
ables are instrumented using lagged levels of those same variables. Initially
we consider only lagged GDP per capita as endogenous, but the procedure is
then expanded to take into account the potential reverse causality between
institutions and growth.
4 Empirical results
A rst look at the evidence is provided in gure 1. These scatter plots show
the bivariate relationship between growth and institutional quality using pe-
riod lengths of 5, 10 and 20 years. The rst impression that the gure conveys
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is that of no relationship between institutional quality and economic growth
with the exception of some particularly dismal growth episodes at the lowest
level of institutional quality. A simple pooled OLS regression of growth on
institutional quality and initial GDP per capita conrms this, as reported in
table 2. The coe¢ cient on institutions is positive and statistically signicant
when we consider the whole sample but becomes smaller and not statistically
signicant if we restrict the sample to those observations with an average in-
stitutional score of 2 or more. Thus, these scatter plots and regressions would
suggest that institutions do not enhance growth once we leave the rst rung
of the institutional ladder.
The pooled OLS results of table 2 are given for illustrative purposes only
since they fail to control for country-specic time-invariant characteristics.
This is of special importance in the present context since the variables that
are in competition with institutions as "ultimate" determinants of economic
development - geography, climate, historical legacy and so on - tend to be
time invariant. In what follows we focus on xed e¤ects regressions as de-
scribed in the previous section.
Our baseline results are presented in table 3. The top panel of this table
estimates equation (1) using all available observations since 1940 and instru-
menting only the initial level of GDP per capita. Results are not supportive
of a role of institutional quality on economic growth. Whether we use 5, 10
or 20 year periods, we always obtain a small and statistically not signicant
coe¢ cient on institutional quality whose value is either negative or null7.
The remaining three panels of table 3 re-estimates our baseline regres-
sion in reduced samples to test for the possibility that the above results
7The standard procedure of using all available lags as instruments is used for 10 and
20 year periods. For 5 year periods we collapse the instrument set using the procedure
described in Roodman (2006) in order to avoid the number of instruments growing too
large.
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are driven by the peculiarities of some group of countries. We exclude
fuel-dependent countries, sub-Saharan African countries and Latin Ameri-
can countries8. Fuel-dependent countries are suspect because oil and gas
riches may allow a country to grow fast despite having decient institutions
(although this hypothesis runs against the well-know "resource course" lit-
erature). Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are two regions that have
underperformed the rest of the developing world over the last few decades
and could be suspected of being in a poverty trap where institutional im-
provements are not helpful. Our results, however, continue to hold in all
samples. In all cases the coe¢ cient on institutional quality remains statis-
tically not signicant, taking at best small positive values when we exclude
fuel-dependent and Latin American countries.
Table 3 also reports for each regression two tests for the suitability of
the instruments: Sargans test of overidentifying restrictions (where the null
hypothesis is that the instrument set is exogenous) and Arellano and Bonds
test for second order autocorrelation in the residuals in di¤erences (where the
null hypothesis is that no second order autocorrelation exists). For the GMM
methodology to be valid these tests should not reject their null hypotheses.
The p-values for the tests indicate that the null of no second order autocor-
relation is not rejected in all cases while the null of an exogenous instrument
set is not rejected in all but one case (all at the 5% level).
The regressions in table 3 do not address the potential reverse causality
from growth to institutions which has been a mayor theme in the empirical
literature. By so doing, they would actually tend to overestimate the e¤ect of
institutions on growth since the presumed reverse e¤ect is also positive. We
address the issue of reverse causality in table 4 by considering institutional
8Fuel-dependent countries are dened as those where fuel exports constitute more than
70% of total exports in the year 2000 (source: World Development Indicators 2009). We
need to exclude countries instead of controlling with dummy variables due to the presence
of country xed e¤ects.
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quality as endogenous and instrumenting for it with its respective lags. As
expected, this results in smaller estimates of the e¤ects of institutions on
growth: our baseline regression now reports small negative e¤ects of institu-
tions on growth which are even statistically signicant when we use 10 and 20
year periods (top panel of table 4). These results continue to hold when we
exclude fuel-dependent, sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries
(not reported).
The middle and lower panels of table 4 modify equation (1) to take ac-
count of potential lags in the e¤ect from institutions to growth. The jus-
tication for this approach is that the investments fostered by high quality
institutions may need a certain time to produce their fruits. Investments in
physical capital require a couple of years to build up plants or machinery,
while investments in human capital could demand considerably longer.
With this in mind, the middle panel considers the value of institutional
quality in the previous period as a determinant of growth in the current
period. The lower panel consider institutional quality in the two preceding
periods as determinants of growth in the current period. Since period length
varies from 5 to 20 years, this procedure allows for a time lag of as much as
40 years before institutional quality has an e¤ect on growth. The empirical
specications are:
gi;t = i + t + yi;t T + Ii;t T=t 2T + "i;t (2)
and
gi;t = i + t + yi;t T + 1Ii;t T=t 2T + 2Ii;t 2T=t 3T + "i;t (3)
In both cases we instrument institutional quality with its own lags, which
seriously constraints the number of available observations; particularly for 20
year periods.
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None of the regressions with lagged values of institutional quality nds
a statistically signicant e¤ect of institutions on growth. Whether we use
equation (2) or (3), it appears that taking into account the dynamic nature
of the relationship between institutions and growth does not change our
conclusions. We also note that all regressions reported in table 4 satisfy the
tests for exogeneity of the instrument set and no second order autocorrelation
in the residuals in di¤erences.
As an additional test of the role of institutions on growth, table 5 presents
the results of country-by-country regressions. This procedure not only con-
trols for all country-specic factors, like the xed e¤ects regressions employed
above, but also allows for an e¤ect of institutions on growth that is di¤erent
in every country. The downside is that we require a large enough number of
observations per country, which leads us to use yearly growth rates instead
of the 5 to 20 year periods considered previously. While this leaves open the
possibility of some yearly growth rates being a¤ected by the state of the busi-
ness cycle, business cycles should a¤ect countries with low and high quality
institutions alike - so there is no reason to fear a bias in the results.
Table 5 reports regression results for each country where some varia-
tion in institutional quality took place.9 All regressions include as a control
variable the initial level of GDP per capita but this is not reported for con-
ciseness. Out of 118 countries for which a regression could be estimated
a clear majority of 88 countries present no statistically signicant relation-
ship between institutional quality and economic growth. The remaining 30
countries with a statistically signicant coe¢ cient are quite evenly split be-
tween those where the relationship is statistically signicant and positive
(17 countries) and those where it is statistically signicant and negative (13
9A certain number of countries do not show any variation in their level of institutional
quality and cannot be included. The United States and Switzerland, for instance, are
always assigned the top score of 7 while Saudi Arabia and Qatar are always assigned the
lowest score of 1.
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countries). In other words, there does not seem to be a tendency for higher
institutional quality to be associated with higher growth when considering
country-by-country regressions.
An additional observation is that several of the countries where a positive
and statistically signicant relationship is found would not be our rst choice
for a case study of how institutions benet growth: Libya, Russia, Equatorial
Guinea and Liberia are all in this group. It is thus di¢ cult to come with a
clear example of a country where institutional quality and growth are posi-
tively related. Table 5 tells us that the opposite relationship is just as likely
to be found.
Overall, all the evidence presented in this section deny the existence of a
positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of institutions on economic growth.
Even the most supportive results presented, when the relationship was esti-
mated using pooled OLS, suggest that any growth benets disappear after
a country passes from the lowest to the second-lowest level of institutional
quality. Once we take into account country specicities by the use of xed
e¤ects or country-by-country regressions, as we naturally should do, not even
that result holds.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper tests the hypothesis that institutional quality, as measured by the
constraints on executive power, are the ultimate driver of economic develop-
ment. While the empirical literature on this subject has been voluminous,
this paper studies the question from an angle that has not been taken pre-
viously. First, we use panel regressions with xed e¤ects to eliminate other
"deep" determinants of economic development that are country-specic. Sec-
ond, we consider growth rates instead of levels of GDP per capita as this
accords better with the underlying theoretical mechanism. Third, we do not
16
include control variables such as private investment, human capital and in-
ternational trade as these are likely to be the outcome of a good institutional
framework and would therefore pick up part of the overall growth e¤ect that
should be assigned to institutions. Finally, we complement our panel regres-
sions with country-by-country regressions which further relax the underlying
assumptions by allowing di¤erent marginal e¤ects across countries.
We do not nd evidence to support the claim that countries characterized
by higher institutional quality experience faster growth. Consistent with the
outlook of the data in simple scatter plots, our econometric results nd small
and statistically not signicant coe¢ cients using several methodologies.
Could our results be the outcome of inadequate data? This is unlikely
for GDP per capita, which is widely accepted as a measure of economic
development and whose values over the period of analysis are not subject
to major controversies. Measuring institutional quality, on the other hand,
is a much more contentious issue. On that account, what we can say is
that the measure of constraints on executive power is intended to capture
a very important aspect of Norths characterization of a good institutional
environment, namely freedom from unilateral expropriation by the state. The
actual measure may still fall short of its authorsintentions, of course, but
if that is the case a large set of empirical results in the literature - most of
which are supportive of the positive role of institutions - would need to be
reconsidered as well.
The results of this paper present us with a puzzle. If institutional quality
has a positive e¤ect on long-term levels of development - as the cross-country
evidence has strongly advocated - we would expect to observe countries
growing faster when their institutions improve. We dont observe that, not
even in the simplest of settings where any variable that could be picking
up the e¤ect from institutional quality has been eliminated. This clearly
suggest that the results from the cross-country studies are either the outcome
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of reverse causality (which could not be solved because of problems with the
instruments) or that a common, unmeasured cause exists for institutions and
economic development. Further research will most likely have more to say
on this absorbing topic.
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